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The Denial of Future Tort Claims in In re Piper
Aircraft: Will the Court's Quick-Fix Solution Keep
the Debtor Flying High or Bring It Crashing Down?
Michelle M. Morgant
I. INTRODUCTION
When a corporate debtor' files for protection from its creditors in the
Bankruptcy Court, it seeks to discharge the claims against it and to
emerge from the proceedings with a fresh start in the business commu-
nity. To accommodate this goal, Congress drafted the definition of the
term "claim" in section 101(5)2 of the United States Bankruptcy Code3
so that "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or
contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case."4
Several courts, applying this definition, have permitted future claim-
ants to assert their claims against a Chapter 11 debtor. However, in
In re Piper Aircraft Corp.,6 the United States District Court for the
Law Clerk for the Honorable William T. Bodoh, United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Ohio; B.A., 1992, Boston College; J.D., 1995, The Ohio
State University College of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Nancy B.
Rapoport for her encouragement and guidance in writing this article. The author would
also like to thank Professor Kathy S. Northern and Heather Lennox for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this article.
1. This Article focuses primarily on the effect future claims have on the
reorganization of an entity under Chapter I I of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
2. Section 101(5) defines "claim" as follows:
(5) "claim" means -
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a-right of payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994).
3. II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
4. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6266.
5. See e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub
nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
6. 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Epstein v. Official Comm. of
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Southern District of Florida reached a different result. The district
court refused to apply the broad definition of "claim" commanded by
both the statutory language and the legislative history and denied the
future claimants the right to participate in Piper's Chapter 11 case.7
Several interests compete with one another in the future claimant
analysis: the debtor's desire to discharge all of its prepetition liabilities
in an effort to receive a fresh start, the creditors' desire to maximize the
debtor's estate to increase their return, the community's desire to
reorganize the company to salvage both jobs and the local economy,
and the future tort victims' interest to reserve a portion of the debtor's
assets to compensate them when their injuries occur.8 The Piper court
chose to follow a narrow analysis of these interests, focusing primarily
on the debtor and the short-term benefits of creditors. Accordingly,
the Piper decision relieved the debtor of its immediate burden of draft-
ing a plan of reorganization that accounted for the $100,000,000
estimated aggregate claim of the future tort victims.9 This result not
only ignores the immediate and long-term concerns of the future tort
victims, but it also fails to consider the long-term effect of the decision
on the debtor and its other creditors.
This Article suggests an answer to the future claimant dilemma that
satisfies both the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and the
long-term goals of all of the parties affected by the Chapter 11 case.
The Article first describes three approaches to determining whether a
claim constitutes a "claim" within the meaning of section 101 (5) of the
Bankruptcy Code and explains the adverse effects of the Piper court's
application of these approaches.'0 The Article then analyzes this
background information under the philosophical theories of Richard
Posner, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick." Next, the Article explores
Unsecured Creditors of Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573 (11 th Cir. 1995).
7. Piper, 168 B.R. at 440.
8. See Margaret 1. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor:
Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the Common Law
Tort System, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1297, 1298-1307 (1983) (discussing the competing
interests at stake in the future claimant situation that existed in the Johns-Manville
reorganization); see also THOMAS H. HACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 2-5 (1986) (discussing generally the broad array of legal rights affected by
bankruptcy law).
9. Piper, 168 B.R. at 436, 440.
10. See infra part II.
11. See infra part IIl. As the discussion infra suggests, each theory approaches the
problem from a slightly different angle. Nozick's theory suggests guidelines similar to
those established in Piper. See infra part III.C. Rawls's and Posner's respective
theories, however, suggest that justice and fundamental bankruptcy principles are best
achieved by allowing future claimants to assert their claims in the bankruptcy case. See
infra parts III.A.-III.B. As such, the latter two theories provide a more complete and
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the feasibility of an approach allowing future claimants to assert their
claims in bankruptcy cases. 2 Finally, the Article suggests that one of
the principal goals of the Bankruptcy Code, providing the debtor with
a fresh start in the community, is best served by allowing such
claims.' 3
II. THE HISTORY OF FUTURE CLAIMANTS IN BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. What Constitutes a "Claim" in Bankruptcy
Whether a particular court permits future claimants to assert their
claims in a bankruptcy case largely depends on the theory used by the
court in determining whether a party holds a "claim" against the debtor
under section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. Although all courts
agree that Congress intended a broad definition of a "claim,"' 4 the
courts have been unable to agree on the appropriate test to determine
the limits of this definition.' 5 As a result, the courts have developed
three tests to aid in this determination: the state law test, the conduct
test, and the prepetition relationship test.
1. The State Law Test
The state law test is the most restrictive test applied by the courts in
determining whether a claim exists against the debtor. Under this test,
a party does not hold a claim against the debtor until that claim has ac-
crued under the applicable state law. 6 The majority of courts that have
considered the issue have declined to adopt the state law claim test.'7
satisfactory analysis of the problem. See infra notes 133-143 and accompanying text.
12. See infra part IV.
13. See infra part V.
14. See e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 (1985) (citing the legislative
history, the court stated that "it is apparent that Congress desired a broad definition of a
'claim"'); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Congress
unquestionably expected this definition to have wide scope."); In re Johns-Manville
Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 754-56 n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that "[i]n enacting the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress specifically intended to afford the broadest possible scope
to the definition of 'claim' so as to enable Chapter 11 to provide pervasive and
comprehensive relief to debtors.").
15. See infra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
16. See In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1160 (1985). In Frenville, the court held that "the threshold question of when a right to
payment arises, absent overriding federal law, 'is to be determined by reference to state
law."' Id. at 337 (quoting Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S.
156, 161 (1946)). "
17. See, e.g., In re Black, 70 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986); Acevedo v. Van Dom
Plastic Machinery Co., 68 B.R. 495 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Yanks, 49 B.R. 56
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
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These courts criticize the test as construing the term "claim" too nar-
rowly and, thus, ignoring the fundamental principles underlying a
Chapter 11 reorganization.' 8 For example, in Piper, the court stated,
"[s]tate or non-bankruptcy law does not and should not override the
bankruptcy policies of equitable distribution to creditors and a fresh
start to the debtor."' 9 Accordingly, the district court in Piper dis-
missed the state law claim test and focused its analysis of the future
claimants' status on the remaining two theories. 20
2. The Conduct Test
The conduct test is another test applied by courts to determine
whether a party holds a claim against the debtor. This test, applied
mostly in mass tort cases,2' focuses on "the time when the acts giving
rise to the alleged liability were performed. ' 22 Under this test, the
"right to the immediate payment of money on account of a claim" does
not have to exist to constitute a section 101(5) claim.23 Rather, the test
is satisfied if "the acts constituting the tort or breach of warranty have
occurred prior to the filing of the petition."24
18. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 624 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 168
B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994), affd sub. nom. Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573 (1 th Cir. 1995); In re Edge,
60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986); see also Black, 70 B.R. 645, 649 (explaining
that the state law claim test is inconsistent with the broad definition of "claim" as used
by several courts, including the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469
U.S. 274 (1985)); Acevedo, 68 B.R. 495 (stating that "the definition of 'claim' is very
broad under I U.S.C. § 101, and properly includes causes of action for indemnity and
contribution.").
19. Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. at 624.
20. Piper, 168 B.R. at 437.
21. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 63 B.R. 986, 990-94 (Bankr. E.D. Va 1986)
(involving the future tort claims of women who used the Dalkon Shield), affid sub nom.
Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Joynes v.
A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); Johns-Manville, 57 B.R. at 686-90
(involving the future tort claims of people who were exposed to asbestos). But see,
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 941-44 (3d Cir.) (holding that a
claim involving exposure to asbestos does not arise until the injury manifests itself),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
The conduct test has also been applied outside the mass tort context. See Edge, 60
B.R. at 701-05 (holding that a claim against a dentist for negligent treatment arose at
the time of the treatment and thus, was a prepetition claim).
22. Johns-Manville, 57 B.R. at 690.
23. A.H. Robins, 839 F.2d at 203. Note that at the time of the court's decision in
A.H. Robins, the text of § 101(5)(A) was found in § 101(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
24. Id. at 203 (discussing whether the future tort victim held a claim for purposes of §
362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code). The court in A.H. Robins further explained its
holding in light of the legislative history of § 101(5)(A): "[lit is . . . apparent that
Congress has created a contingent right to payment as it has the power to create a
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Although prepetition conduct of the debtor satisfies the conduct test,
the Piper court held that prepetition contact between the debtor and the
future claimant must also occur in addition to prepetition conduct.
25
Thus, even though the Piper court analyzed both the conduct test and
the prepetition relationship test, its interpretation of the two tests, as
discussed below, is essentially the same.
3. The Prepetition Relationship Test
To qualify as a claim under the prepetition relationship test, "there
must be some prepetition relationship, such as contact, exposure,
impact, or privity, between the debtor's prepetition conduct and the
claimant., 26 Although some overlap exists between the conduct test
and the prepetition relationship test, the prepetition relationship test is
more restrictive, requiring some form of prepetition contact between
claimant and debtor.27 The Piper court adopted the prepetition rela-
tionship test.28
B. Piper's Application of the Conduct and Prepetition
Relationship Tests
Piper Aircraft Corporation ("Piper") is a general aviation aircraft
manufacturer and distributor.29 Piper commenced operations in 1937
and since that time has been a defendant in several products liability
suits related to "its manufacture, design, sale, distribution, and support
of aircraft and parts."' As a result of the economic strain caused by
these lawsuits, Piper filed a Chapter 11 voluntary petition for relief on
July 1, 1991.31
During the course of its bankruptcy case, Piper entered into negotia-
tions to sell all of its assets to Pilatus Aircraft Limited ("Pilatus").
Pilatus, concerned about potential liability for pending and future
products liability cases, requested that the court appoint a legal repre-
sentative to represent the interests of future claimants.32 The
contingent tort or like claim within the protection of § 362(a)(1)." Id.
25. Piper, 168 B.R. at 438.
26. Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. at 627.
27. Id.
28. Piper, 168 B.R. at 440.
29. Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. at 621.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Bankruptcy Court's order defined "future claimants" as:
All persons, whether known or unknown, born or unborn, who may, after the
date of confirmation of Piper's chapter 11 plan of reorganization, assert a
claim or claims for personal injury, property damage, wrongful death,
19951
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Bankruptcy Court appointed a representative, who then filed a proof of
claim in the amount of approximately $100,000,000 on behalf of all
future claimants.33 Both the unsecured creditors' committee and Piper
objected to the proof of claim and asserted that the future claimants did
not hold section 101(5) claims in the bankruptcy case.34 Finding that
no prepetition relationship existed between Piper and the future claim-
ants, the Bankruptcy Court sustained the objection and disallowed the
claims."
In affirming the Bankruptcy Court's decision, the district court
analyzed the claims of the future claimants under both the conduct test
and the prepetition relationship test.36 Although it ultimately declined
to apply the conduct test, the court interpreted the test as requiring: (1)
a debtor's wrongful prepetition act; (2) the future claimant's prepetition
exposure to the defective product; and (3) a resulting postpetition
injury.3 1 Under this interpretation, the court reasoned that Piper's pre-
petition manufacturing and design did not satisfy the conduct test.
damages, contribution and/or indemnification, based in whole or in part upon
events occurring or arising after the Confirmation Date, including claims
based on the law of product liability, against Piper or its successor arising out
of or relating to aircraft or parts manufactured and sold, designed, distributed or
supported by Piper prior to the Confirmation Date.
Id. at 621 n.1.
33. Id. at 621-22.
34. Id. at 622.
35. Id. at 629.
36. Piper, 168 B.R. at 437-40.
37. Id. at 434, 438. The court's interpretation of the conduct test resulted from the
distinctions that it drew between cases applying the conduct test and the facts of the case
before it. See, e.g., A.H. Robins, 839 F.2d at 198; Johns-Manville, 57 B.R. at 680. As
stated in A.H. Robins, 839 F.2d at 200, 203, and Johns-Manville, 57 B.R. at 686-87,
the purpose underlying the conduct test is to facilitate the broad scope of "claim" under §
101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. By failing to acknowledge such purpose, the Piper court
interpreted the conduct test so restrictively that this test is indistinguishable from the
prepetition test. Thus, the Piper court's conduct test suffers from the same flaw as the
prepetition relationship test in that it removes the word "contingent" from the
definition of "claim" under § 101(5).
38. Piper, 168 B.R. at 437-39. This author agrees with the court that the mere manu-
facturing and design of a product is not sufficient to give rise to a "claim" under § 101(5)
of the Bankruptcy Code. However, where there is a defect in the prepetition design or
manufacturing process, this tortious act by the debtor gives rise to liability that is
"conditioned upon the occurrence of some future event." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 321
(6th ed. 1990) (defining "contingent"). Accordingly, in the latter situation, the future
claimant does hold a § 101(5) claim against the debtor. It is important to distinguish a
postpetition accident that happens by chance and is not due to any wrongful prepetition
conduct of the debtor from a postpetition accident occurring due to the prepetition
conduct of the debtor that created a defect in the design or manufacturing process of the
product. For further discussion of this distinction, see infra part 11.C.2.
[Vol. 27
In re Piper Aircraft
Although the court rejected the application of the conduct test, the
interpretation of the conduct test described by the court is essentially
the same as the prepetition relationship test that it ultimately adopted.3 9
The court's application of the prepetition relationship test required that
"some 'prepetition relationship' between the debtor and the future
claimants... exist in order for future claimant to have a 'claim' under
the Code." 4 The court concluded that because the future claimants'
claim did not meet the prepetition relationship requirement, it failed the
prepetition relationship test."
C. The Ramifications of Piper on the Legal Rights of Future
Claimants
1. Piper Redefines a "Claim" Under Section 101(5)
During the pendency of the case, the future claimants' legal repre-
sentative advanced the argument that the prepetition relationship test
"effectively disregards and removes the words 'contingent' and
'unmatured' from the statutory definition of 'claim."' 42 Although the
Piper court acknowledged this argument, the court never reconciled
this argument with its application of the prepetition relationship test.43
The court's failure to recognize the broad scope of the statutory defi-
nition of "claim" caused it to interpret the conduct test and the pre-
petition relationship test as requiring the same elements. The Piper
court ignored the fact that the conduct test originated to facilitate the
broad statutory definition of "claim" in section 101(5). Indeed, under
this original interpretation, a "contingent" claim existed if the claim
"depend[ed] upon a future uncertain event.""4 Further, as the court in
Grady v. A.H. Robins explained:
39. The Piper court acknowledged that "the Prepetition Relationship Test and the
Conduct Test are not mutually exclusive." Piper, 168 B.R. at 439. However, there is
little, if any, distinction between the court's interpretation of the two tests.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 439-40.
42. Id. at 437.
43. Id.
44. A.H. Robins, 839 F.2d at 202-03. The A.H. Robins court focused its formu-
lation of the conduct test on complying with the statutory language and legislative
history of § 101(5). Id. The court in A.H. Robins then applied its definition of contin-
gent under the conduct test to the facts before it and held that "manifestation of injury
from the use of the Dalkon Shield" constituted a contingent claim under § 101(5). Id.
Although the court only discussed the application of its test to the facts of its case, the
underlying premise of its theory-that Congress intended contingent claims to come
within the bankruptcy case-applies to the analysis of any claim asserted against a
debtor. Id.
19951
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It is . . . apparent that there can be no right to the immediate
payment of money on account of a claim, the existence of
which depends upon a future uncertain event. But it is also
apparent that Congress has created a contingent right to
payment as it has the power to create a contingent tort or like
claim ....
Under a literal reading of section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code,
the Piper future claimants hold contingent and unmatured claims in the
46bankruptcy case. The conduct necessary to give rise to their tort
claims is "sufficiently rooted in the present ' 47 to satisfy the require-
ments of section 101(5). The Piper debtor engaged in a wrongful
conduct prepetition, and the future claimants' right to payment
"depends upon a future uncertain event," 48 namely, the injury caused
by the defective prepetition product.49
45. Id. at 203; see also supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (explaining that the
conduct test focuses on "the time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were
performed.").
46. When interpreting a statute, great weight is usually accorded the plain meaning of
the statutory language and the legislative intent supporting such an interpretation. See
Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50 (1993) (arguing
that courts properly use literal meanings of words to interpret statutory language).
Further, under the canons of statutory construction and, more specifically, the whole act
rule, a statute is to be interpreted so as to give every word meaning and to avoid
surplusage. See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992)
(stating that "courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language
superfluous ....").
The Piper court fails to adhere to any of these common notions of statutory
construction. Rather, the court essentially rewrites the statutory definition of "claim"
and excludes a contingent and unmatured claim, both of which are currently covered by
the plain language of § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.
47. Piper, 168 B.R. at 439. In stating this proposition, the Piper court cites In re
UNR Industries, 20 F.3d 766 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 509 (1994), and recites
the following quote: "Bankruptcy separates the past and future of an enterprise,
satisfying claims attributable to yesterday's activities out of existing assets . I..." Id. at
771. Although the court cites this quote to support its application of the prepetition
relationship test, the quoted words of the UNR Industries court support the application of
the A.H. Robins' conduct test to the Piper future claimants. In the case at hand, Piper
created the defective condition of its product prepetition and, accordingly, any liability
for this prepetition activity should come out of existing corporate assets to ensure the
future tort victims some recovery and to allow Piper's reorganized successor a true fresh
start. See infra part II.C. If the existing assets of the debtor cannot cover the liabilities
that it has created, this may serve as a signal to the Bankruptcy Court that either
reorganization is not feasible and liquidation should be pursued or that the circumstances
require it to use its equitable powers under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code and permit
reorganization while preserving the future tort victims' claims against the successor
company. Id.
48. A.H. Robins, 839 F.2d at 203.
49. Id. Such a result also accords with the legislative history of § 101(5) that
"contemplates 'the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court."' Id. at 203; see
In re Piper Aircraft
2. The Piper Court Ignored the Nature of the Debtor's Prepetition
Conduct
In rejecting the conduct test, the Bankruptcy Court in Piper relied
upon the following hypothetical formulated by the Second Circuit in In
re Chateaugay Corp.50 to demonstrate the problems it saw with the
conduct test:
Is there a 'claim' on behalf of the 10 people who will be killed
when they drive across the bridge that will fall someday in the
future? If the only test is whether the ultimate right to payment
will arise out of the debtor's prepetition conduct, the future
victims have a 'claim.' Yet it must be obvious that enormous
practical and perhaps constitutional problems would arise from
recognition of such a claim. The potential victims are not only
unidentified, but there is no way to identify them. Sheer
fortuity will determine who will be set on that one bridge when it
crashes.5'
Although the hypothetical states a persuasive argument for where the
definitional limits of "claim" should fall, it does not address the situ-
ation in Piper.
Unlike the Chateaugay hypothetical, in Piper, several products
liability suits existed prepetition.52 Furthermore, the court appointed a
legal representative to represent the interests of individuals likely to be
injured postpetition by prepetition conduct similar to that asserted in
the pending products liability suits. 53 These future tort claimants are
not the victims of "sheer fortuity" as if the planes were simply pre-
dicted to crash due to normal wear and tear on the product, as in the
bridge hypothetical. Rather, Piper's tortious prepetition conduct is
predicted to cause the future injuries. Thus, Piper is held liable for the
defective design and manufacturing of its product, and the wrongful
conduct giving rise to the contingent claim for products liability should
be viewed as prepetition activity.
3. Piper Frustrates the Policy Goals of Bankruptcy and Tort Law
The Piper decision thwarts congressional intent to apply a broad
also supra notes 4, 21-24, and accompanying text (discussing § 101(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code).
50. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
5 1. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 626-27 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (citing
Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1003).
52. Id. at 620.
53. See id.; see also supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (detailing the specific
facts of Piper).
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reading of the term "claim" under section 101(5)."4 This, in turn,
frustrates the fundamental bankruptcy principle of providing the debtor
with a fresh start." Furthermore, the decision frustrates the goals of
tort law to compensate victims and to deter future harmful conduct.
56
Several concerns arise from the Piper decision. First, the decision
may hamper a sale of the debtor's assets by allowing potential suc-
cessor liability to depreciate the value of the debtor's assets. Whether
this concern becomes a reality for a potential purchaser, however,
largely depends upon the successor liability test employed by the
court. In determining such liability, courts generally apply one of
three tests: the traditional successor liability test;57 the product line
test;58 or the continuity of enterprise test.59 The most recent trend in
products liability cases holds that the successor corporation can be held
liable for the bankrupt's post-confirmation claims.6" Therefore,
54. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 (1985) (explaining that there is no
indication that there is a claim unless there is a contractual arrangement).
55. See generally MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION (1987)
(discussing the policy goals underlying the bankruptcy system); Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 (1993)
(discussing the policy goals underlying the bankruptcy system).
56. See generally Steven J. Parent, Comment, Judicial Creativity in Dealing with
Mass Torts in Bankruptcy, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 381 (1990) (explaining in a
general discussion the policy goals of the tort system).
57. The traditional test for successor liability holds that a purchaser of all of another
corporation's assets is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation,
subject to four exceptions: (1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
such debts and liabilities; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of
the corporations; (3) the purchaser is merely a continuation of the selling corporation;
or (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such
debts and liabilities. See, e.g, Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341,
343 (8th Cir. 1988) (explaining the four prongs of the traditional test for successor
liability).
58. The product line test holds a successor corporation liable if that corporation
continues to manufacture the same product line as the predecessor corporation, under the
same name and with no outward indication of a change of ownership. See, e.g., Ray v.
Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977) (justifying placing the burden of the cost of paying
for injuries caused by product of a previous corporation on the successor corporation via
the product line test); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981)
(reinforcing the theory behind the product line test); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co.,
434 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. Super. 1981) (explaining the use of the product line test);
Martin v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (using the product line test to
find for the plaintiff).
59. The continuity of enterprise test holds a successor corporation liable if: (1) the
purchaser retains the predecessor's general operations; (2) the predecessor dissolves; (3)
the purchaser assumes the normal business obligations of the predecessor; and (4) the
purchaser holds itself out as a continuation of the predecessor. See, e.g., Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-83 (Mich. 1976) (explaining the
continuity of enterprise test).
60. See Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Foster, 730 F.2d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1984);
In re Piper Aircraft
regardless of which test the court uses, a purchaser, such as Pilatus in
Piper, may be exposed to costly liability for assets purchased from a
bankrupt entity.
Similar issues arise for a reorganized debtor. For example, if sub-
sequent to reorganization the debtor faces multiple lawsuits for claims
not asserted in and, thus, not discharged by the bankruptcy case, the
reorganized debtor is potentially liable as a continuation of the pre-
petition debtor. Under either the product line or continuity of enterprise
theories of successor liability,6' such liability will likely force the
reorganized company to file once again for the protection of the
Bankruptcy Court.62 Thus, by not allowing claims for the debtor's
wrongful prepetition activity to be handled in the initial bankruptcy
case, the Piper decision places the debtor, creditors, and tort victims in
a worse position with assets of diminished value and more creditors to
satisfy.
Finally, by excluding claims rooted in prepetition conduct from a
bankruptcy case, the risk exists that compensational resources for
future claimants will dry up by the time the claimants assert their
claims against the reorganized debtor or successor corporation.63
Also, allowing the debtor to escape liability for wrongful prepetition
conduct frustrates the goal of deterring such wrongful conduct by the
debtor and others in the future.64 Under Piper, a tortfeasor may escape
financial responsibility by simply filing for the protection of the bank-
ruptcy court. While a claimant can still assert a claim at a later time,
the successor and debtor company may be two different entities.
Therefore, the true wrongdoer may avoid financial punishment.
65
Renkiewicz v. Allied Prod. Corp., 492 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal
denied, 505 N.W.2d 579 (Mich.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 601 (1993).
61. See Renkiewicz, 492 N.W.2d at 823 (addressing the possibility of successor
liability attaching to a claim arising one month after the confirmation of the debtor's
plan of reorganization).
62. While § 350(b) permits the Bankruptcy Court to reopen a bankruptcy case for
cause, it is an extremely difficult motion to make and the courts have not received such
motions favorably in the products liability area. See, e.g., Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v.
Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 161-64 (7th Cir. 1994); Mooney Aircraft, 730 F.2d at 373, 375
(remanding the case to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); In re Yoder Co., 158 B.R.
99, 100 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (denying the motion to reopen a bankruptcy case after
assets had been sold due to a lack of justification).
63. See In re Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. 743, 745-75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (grant-
ing "future claimants" the right to be heard at a bankruptcy proceeding). The Johns-
Manville court discusses similar concerns regarding limited compensational resources in
the asbestos context. Id.
64. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OFTORTS 23 (1971) (explaining the prevention
of similar future harm as one incentive underlying tort liability).
65. Even if the debtor and the successor corporation are the same entity, a strong
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III. WHAT "SHOULD" THE ANSWER TO THE FUTURE CLAIMANT
PROBLEM BE?
Whether a future claimant holds a cognizable claim against a debtor
is a complex question. Several factors need consideration, including
the interests of various parties affected by the answer to this question.
Therefore, in attempting to formulate an answer, this part analyzes the
future claimant problem under various economic and legal theories.
This analysis is not meant to produce a clear-cut rule, but merely to set
forth guidelines for courts to follow.
A. Posner's Wealth Maximization Theory
Courts and commentators often use economic theories as analytical
tools to explain various legal rules.66 Richard Posner is a leading
figure in such positive applications of economic analysis and a driving
force behind the normative approach to economics that provides "an
ethical basis for the organization and operation of social institutions."'67
Posner's normative approach "takes the positive analysis one step
further, arguing that economic analysis explains not only the way the
law does work, but also the way the law should work."
68
1. The Principles of Wealth Maximization
Under Posner's theory of wealth maximization, an institution or
legal rule is just if it maximizes the aggregate wealth of society.69
Posner defines wealth as "the value in dollars or dollar equivalents...
of everything in society,' ' 70 and measures wealth by "what people are
likelihood exists that the corporation's resources will diminish by the time it is finally
held liable for its prepetition conduct. Thus, the debtor can still escape full liability and
the tort victims will not be fully compensated for their losses.
66. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (3d ed. 1986)
(explaining the law in economic terms); Whitney Cunningham, Note, Testing Posner's
Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization, 81 GEO. L.J. 141 (1992); Ronald M. Dworkin,
Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) (explaining the economic rationale
behind the law).
67. Richard Schmalbeck, The Justice of Economics: An Analysis of Wealth
Maximization as a Normative Goal, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 488 (1983).
68. Id. at 491.
69. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 61 (198 1) [hereinafter POSNER];
see also Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social
Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6-7; Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited,
2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85, 86-89 (1985) [hereinafter Posner, Wealth
Maximization]; Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 119-20 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Utilitarianism]; Richard A.
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Efficiency Norm].
70. Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 69, at 119.
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willing to pay for something or, if they already own it, what they
demand in money to give it up."'" Although these economic justifi-
cations may not appear to explain a concept of justice, Posner argues
that such notions do lead to a just society because if the institutions and
legal rules were viewed from an ex ante position, rational individuals
would choose those institutions and legal rules that maximize society's
wealth.72
In measuring societal wealth, the only preferences accounted for are
those "that are backed up by money, that is, that are registered in a
market. 7 3 This measurement does not need to be based upon an
actual national market, for it is clearly impossible to measure societal
values such as family and entertainment in such a manner. Rather,
such activities are valued according to a hypothetical market.74
Posner's theory uses this hypothetical market analysis to evaluate
several situations in which either no explicit market exists, or the trans-
action costs are prohibitive, as in the typical accident case. 7 5
Accordingly, one should posit any analysis of the Piper decision under
the wealth maximization theory as a hypothetical market transaction.
In Piper, the rights of the future claimants to remain free from injury
and Piper's right to conduct its business affairs profitably compete
with one another.76 The value of the future claimants' rights equals the
71. Id.
72. POSNER, supra note 69, at 94-101.
73. Id. at 61.
74. Id. at 61-63; see also Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 69, at 119-20 (explain-
ing how the market influences every decision and behavior).
75. POSNER, supra note 69, at 61-62, 79-81; see also Posner, Utilitarianism, supra
note 69, at 119-20. Posner believes that in cases where the transaction costs are high,
i.e., an involuntary transaction, the court can formulate "a reasonably accurate guess as
to the allocation of resources that would maximize wealth." POSNER, supra note 69, at
62; see also Posner, Wealth Maximization, supra note 69, at 91 (explaining further this
model of economics and behavior). This function of the court is consistent with the
underlying assumption of Posner's economic theories of the law that courts work to
allocate resources efficiently. See Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent
Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775, 775-
76 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, Reply].
76. The wealth-maximization analysis of Piper proceeds based upon the rights as
they are initially allocated among the parties. Because Piper involves an involuntary
transaction, the principles of wealth maximization redistribute wealth to some extent.
See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text; Posner, Wealth Maximization, supra
note 69, at 104. However, the determinacy of initial allocation of rights in voluntary
transactions under wealth maximization has been criticized as circular. See, e.g., Jules
L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509,
525-26 (1980); Dworkin, supra note 66, at 207; Schmalbeck, supra note 67, at 499-
501. For Posner's view of this criticism of circularity, see Posner, Reply, supra note
75, at 786-87.
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price which they would accept in exchange for their right to remain
free from injury, and the value that Piper places on the future claim-
ants's rights equals the price which it would pay to purchase the
rights." If these were the only factors to consider in the equation,
having Piper purchase the right to invade the rights of the future
claimants would only be efficient if Piper paid more than the asking
price of the future claimants. However, this transaction is not volun-
tary, and the fact that Piper violates the rights of the future claimants
through allegedly tortious conduct must enter the equation.7
Wealth maximization encompasses notions of corrective justice and,
thus; once unjust acts occur, "a failure to rectify such acts would
reduce the wealth of society by making such acts more common. 79
Further, wealth-maximization principles support a rule of strict liability
both when the injurer can best avoid the accident, and when the injured
party can do nothing to prevent the injury. 80 These principles accord
with the notions of products liability law that apply to the Piper analy-
sis. Under products liability law, once a defect in product design or
manufacture is established, a party is strictly liable for harm caused by
the defective product.8' In determining whether such a defect exists,
the courts utilize a cost-benefit analysis. 2 Thus, when the expected
accident costs exceed the costs of avoiding a product defect, a product
is defective and such a defect constitutes an act of injustice because, as
illustrated by the cost-benefit analysis defining the defect, the act
"reduces the wealth of society."83
Applying these corrective justice notions of wealth maximization in
the future claimant context, it appears that the optimal result is reached
only by allowing the claims of the future claimants. The assertion of a
77. See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 69, at 119 (explaining basic value
principles of wealth maximization); see also Cunningham, supra note 66, at 143-44
(discussing the measurement of value by the "willingness and ability to pay").
78. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 29-31 (1987) (discussing liability rules and their efficiency
under a wealth-maximization system); Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 69, at 127
(discussing the application of tort law under a wealth maximization theory).
79. POSNER, supra note 69, at 74. Posner defines an "act of injustice" as that which
"reduces the wealth of society." Id. The lack of deterrence that may flow from the Piper
decision is discussed supra note 56 and accompanying text.
80. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 78, at 37-39; see also POSNER, supra note 69, at
192-99 (explaining the economic reasoning of wealth maximization and promoting
strict liability to protect the public).
8 1. ARTHUR W. MURPHY, ET. AL., THE LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY, PROBLEMS, AND
POLICIES 21-26 (1982).
82. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 78, at 291-92.
83. POSNER, supra note 69, at 74.
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product defect, even if the claimants have not yet suffered injuries by
the product, gives rise to strict liability so long as the defects exist.8 4
Thus, in the Piper situation, were the future claimants given the
opportunity, they could have established that their claim, valued at
$100,000,000, exceeded what it would have cost Piper to avoid the
product defect.8 5
Once future claimants demonstrate the tortfeasor's act of injustice,
the courts should allow their claims in the bankruptcy case thereby
holding the injurer accountable for its acts. 6 Such accountability
prevents the injurer's acts from further decreasing the wealth of
society, because it deters potential injurers from committing similar
acts of injustice.87
Not only does the application of wealth-maximization principles
justify the above result, but long-term policy considerations under the
wealth-maximization theory also support this result. As previously
noted, wealth maximization focuses on the aggregate wealth of
society, not of the individual.88 Accordingly, if the initial bankruptcy
case does not account for the acts of injustice committed by the injurer,
the lack of significant deterrence and the future acts of the tortfeasor
threaten the wealth of society. 9
Having escaped liability once, the tortfeasor has no incentive to
correct the existing defect or to work to prevent future defects in other
products. 9° Consequently, this lack of incentive provides a likelihood
84. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
85. Having the future claimants produce such evidence further strengthens the
assertion that the prepetition conduct of the debtor suffices to support their claim under
§ 101(5) because it establishes that the cause of their future injuries is sufficiently rooted
in the present (i.e., the debtor's wrongful prepetition conduct). For a discussion of these
concerns regarding § 101(5) in Piper, see supra notes 27, 37-41, 44-49 and accompany-
ing text.
Further, under the wealth-maximization theory, the fact that the claimants' injuries
have not yet occurred is not a significant factor in the analysis, because the theory
focuses on maximizing societal and not individual wealth. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text. Thus, once a product defect is established, the injurer is strictly
liable for the decrease in societal wealth that it has created.
86. Such a result accords with Posner's view that corrective justice notions under a
wealth-maximization theory should correct market failures such as externalities.
POSNER, supra note 69, at 103. Accordingly, wealth maximization requires that a party
internalize the costs of doing business, which includes the cost of correcting its
defective products.
87. See id. at 74; supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 69-70, 79 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
90. Wealth maximization achieves the desired social behavior that maximizes soci-
etal wealth by altering incentives. See POSNER, supra note 69, at 75.
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that the tortfeasor will further decrease the wealth of society by
repeating its tortious acts. Eventually, this may cause the tortfeasor to
financially fail for a second time." Thus, under the principles of
wealth maximization, holding the producer of a defective product re-
sponsible for its wrongful conduct by allowing the claims of future
claimants will protect the aggregate wealth of society.
B. Rawls's "Justice as Fairness" Theory
John Rawls's theory of social justice focuses on the "basic structure
of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social insti-
tutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the
division of advantages from social cooperation. 9 2 Rawls developed
normative principles which may guide the direction of bankruptcy
law.93 Indeed, Rawls's concern that rights and duties are fairly dis-
tributed throughout society corresponds with the traditional goals of
bankruptcy laws.94
1. The Principles of Justice
For Rawls, principles of justice encompass those ideas that equally-
situated, free and rational individuals would select to govern their
association.95 To formulate such principles, Rawls analyzes society
from what he terms the "original position."96 In the original position,
all members of society are placed on an equal level and no one receives
9 1. For a discussion of this concern in the context of the Piper decision, see supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
92. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE]; See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 5, 35 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J.
PHIL. 515, 519 (1980).
93. For an illustration of how Rawls's principles of justice apply to a general
analysis and evaluation of the bankruptcy system, see Rasmussen, supra note 69;
Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy
Law, 71 TEx. L. REV. 541 (1993).
94. See Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 5 ("Generally, [the] goals of bankruptcy law
include saving jobs, assessing the needs of the surrounding community, treating
creditors equally, and assuring compensation for tort victims.").
95. See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 4, 12-16.
96. See id. at 12, 17-21. Rawls explains that the purpose of the original position is
"to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just." Id. at 136; see
also REX MARTIN, RAWLS AND RIGHTS 15-19 (1985) (characterizing the Rawlsian theory
called the "original position" as a framework for other philosophical approaches to
social and economic justice); Michael .D. Weiss, A Jurisprudence of Blindness: Rawls'
Justice and Legal Theory, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 565, 569-72 (1993) (reconsidering the
construction of the original position, particularly the role of the theoretically defined
individuals who are to reason to the principles of justice).
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advantages or disadvantages due to natural endowments. 97 In order to
formulate the ideal system of justice, individuals in the original
position are situated behind a "veil of ignorance," oblivious to their
position in society. 98 As a result, individuals behind the veil of
ignorance cannot mold principles to the specificity of their own
situation."
As applied under Rawls's theory, individuals behind the veil of
ignorance select the following two principles of justice to evaluate the
rules and institutions of society: (1) "each person is to have an equal
right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar
liberty for others"; I° and (2) "social and economic inequalities are to
be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to
everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to
all." 0' The first principle seeks to ensure the protection of the indi-
vidual's rights through the creation of a just constitution and the
second principle "dictates that social and economic policies be aimed at
maximizing the long-term expectations of the least advantaged under
97. See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 92.
98. See id. at 136-41 ("As far as possible, then, the only particular facts which the
parties know is that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever
this implies."); see also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 24 n.27, 305
(illustrating how participants behind the veil of ignorance reason to the principles of
justice); Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 11-13 (stating that although persons in the
original position do not know their status in society, they are "moral persons" in that
they establish an individual sense of morality that enables them to understand and
conform to selected principles of justice).
For criticisms of the feasibility of such a veil of ignorance in the original position,
see Louis Katzner, The Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance, in RAWLS, THEORY
OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 42; Weiss, supra note 96.
99. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 18; see also John Rawls,
Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 58 (Peter Laslett & W.G.
Runciman eds., 3d ed. 1967).
100. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 60. Since the publication of A
Theory of Justice, Rawls has modified this first principle of justice. See John Rawls,
The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in 3 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 5,
46-55 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982) (replacing "most extensive total system" with
"a fully adequate scheme" because the basic liberties scheme was not created to maximize
liberties but rather to guarantee the social conditions needed for the development and
exercise of these liberties). As presented in Rawls's latest work, the first principle
states: "Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights
and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this
scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their
fair value." RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 92, at 5.
This modification of the first principle of justice does not affect the analysis of the
future claimants' dilemma under Rawls's Theory of Justice, as the future claimant
analysis focuses on the "maximum" concept articulated- in general analysis of
bankruptcy law. See Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 14 n.48, 16-17.
101. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 60.
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conditions of fair equality of opportunity, subject to the equal liberties
being maintained."'0 2 The latter application of the second principle is
referred to as the "maximin" or "difference principle."'0 3
2. The Principles of Justice and the Future Claimant Dilemma
In order to evaluate the status of future claimants under Rawls's
theory of social justice, it is necessary to analyze the competing inter-
ests of the parties involved from behind the veil of ignorance in the
original position.'04 The veil of ignorance removes the labels of the
parties, ensuring that the decisions made are not at the expense of the
least-advantaged group of individuals.0 5
Considering the facts of Piper from behind the veil of ignorance, the
group of individuals exposed to the greatest amount of risk, and ac-
cordingly the least-advantaged group, is the class of future tort
claimants. Not only do future tort claimants risk the uncertainties
faced by the average tort victim in a bankruptcy case, those of under-
compensation due to the depletion of assets,' ° but future tort victims
also face the possibility of no redress for their harm, as the wrong-
doer's assets may become uncollectible in the near future. 10 7 Thus, in
comparison to the other parties involved in Piper,'18 the future tort
102. Id. at 199.
103. See infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
principle. See also Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 14-15 (explaining the maximin
principle as a principle that "seeks to maximize the utility of the class in the minimum
position, i.e., the class that has the smallest amount of primary goods."); MARTIN, supra
note 96, at 42-44.
For criticisms of the difference principle, see BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 214
(1989); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 198-203 (1974).
104. Rasmussen argues that the original position and its veil of ignorance are
particularly useful in the bankruptcy context, because "[riather than artificially
narrowing the inquiry solely to a particular firm in distress, or specific creditors of that
firm, use of the veil of ignorance permits an examination of a bankruptcy regime's
overall effects on the way in which the basic structure distributes society's primary
goods." Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 12.
105. See id. at 14-15.
106. See id. at 31-32.
107. For a discussion of this potential risk under the Piper decision, see supra notes
63-65 and accompanying text.
108. The other parties that factor into this equation are as follows: (I) the debtor,
who is not only protected by the Bankruptcy Court but is the wrongdoer in this scenario;
(2) the secured creditors, who not only have allowable claims in the bankruptcy case but
also collateral from which to collect; and (3) the unsecured creditors, including the tort
victims in pending litigation, who also hold claims in the bankruptcy case, even though
they stand to lose some upon the inclusion of the future tort victims. This potential loss
of the unsecured creditors is not relevant to the analysis under the principles of justice,
because the unsecured creditors are not the least-advantaged members. See RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 66-67, 78-80; see also MARTIN, supra note 96, at
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claimants occupy the position of the least-advantaged group.
Because the individuals behind the veil of ignorance do not know
who will be members of the least-advantaged groups-the future tort
victims-they would not agree to any rules that adversely affect a
given party."° The maximin principle requires that any change in the
position of the future tort claimants in the bankruptcy case be an
improvement; otherwise, such a decision would not be chosen by
those behind the veil of ignorance."' Accordingly, individuals behind
the veil of ignorance would view the slightest prepetition conduct by
the debtor as sufficient for bringing a claim. This result accords with
Congress' broad definition of the term "claim."'''
Thus, applying Rawls's principles of justice, wrongful prepetition
conduct by the debtor can give rise to a section 101(5) claim in the
bankruptcy case. This result is equitable because it is reached through
an unbiased procedure.' 12 From a societal view, it is also fair because
all of the parties who will be adversely affected by the conduct of the
debtor are permitted to participate in the bankruptcy case.
C. Nozick's Entitlement Theory
In contrast to the notions of equality underlying Rawls's theory of
social justice, Robert Nozick endorses an entitlement theory that
espouses individual rights protected by minimal state intervention."
13
As Nozick explains: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no
person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)."" 4
Nozick bases his theory upon three basic concepts: (1) the principle of
justice in acquisition; (2) the principle of justice in holdings; and (3)
91-97 (construing the maximin principle as optimality, i.e., you cannot make one
person better off at the expense of another, and egalitarianism which Martin described as
"minimizing the difference between the expectations of the most-favored representative
and the least-advantaged representative.").
109. See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 150-60.
110. See id. at 136-37, 154.
111. See supra notes 4, 18-19, and accompanying text.
112. See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 136 ("The aim is to use the
notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the
effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social
and natural circumstances to their own advantage.") For further discussion of Rawls's
concept of procedural fairness, see MARTIN, supra note 96, at 14-18 & n.25.
113. See NoZICK, supra note 103, at 120-22, 150-53, 230-31; see also Linda R.
Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REV. 983,
1006-07 (1990) (discussing Nozick's assertion that "the only justifiable state is the
minimal state, protecting its citizens against force and fraud in the form of 'boundary
crossings' against existing holdings.").
114. NoZICK, supra note 103, at ix.
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the rectification of injustice in holdings." 5 The first two principles are
evaluated by the history of the particular distribution," 6 while the third
principle compensates an individual for any injustices in this
history." 7
Under Nozick's theory, an individual does not become entitled to a
greater or lesser share of the distribution because of considerations
such as moral merit, usefulness to society, or need." 8 Rather, each
individual gets what he or she deserves. Indeed, "historical principles
of justice hold that past circumstances or actions of people can create
differential entitlement or differential deserts to things.""
Once the historical principles are satisfied and a just distribution
occurs, 2 the individual can use his or her distributions in any manner
that he or she sees fit within his or her personal sphere.' 2 ' While in
this personal sphere, the state has a duty to protect the individual. As a
result of this protective duty, the state has the power to redistribute
assets. 
22
115. See id. at 150-53.
116. See id. at 153-55. Nozick asserts that his entitlement theory is historical in
principle (i.e., "whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about") and con-
trasts this with Rawls's theory, which Nozick believes is an end-result principle (i.e.,
"justice of a distribution is determined by how things are distributed (who has what) as
judged by some structural principles of just distribution."). Id.
For Nozick's criticism of Rawls's theory as being an end-result principle, see id. at
198-204; see also John Stick, Turning Rawls into Nozick and Back Again, 81 Nw. U. L.
REV. 363, 376-79 (1987).
117. See NOZICK, supra note 103, at 152; see also RONALD J. MANN, BANKRUPTCY
AND DISTRmUTIVE JUSTICE: WHOSE MONEY IS IT ANYWAY?, (forthcoming 1995).
118. NoZICK, supra note 103, at 156.
119. Id. at 155 (emphasis omitted).
120. "Mhe holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of
justice in acquisition and transfer [i.e., voluntary exchanges], or by the principle of
rectification of injustice (as specified by the first two principles)." Id. at 153. Further,
"[i]f each person's holdings are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just."
Id.
For a thorough discussion of the appropriation aspects of Nozick's entitlement
theory, see G.A. COHEN, Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and Equality, in JUSTICE
AND EQUALITY HERE AND Now 108, 118-26 (Frank L. Lucash ed., 1986).
121. For an explanation of an individual's "moral space," see NOZICK supra note 103,
at 57-58. See also Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy,
73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 789 n.82 (1985) (explaining Nozick's "conception of a private
domain" as that "which defines the individual's discretionary space, within which he can
work out his conception of happiness") (quoting Fried, Is Liability Possible?, in 3 THE
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 91, 120-21 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982)).
122. See NOZICK, supra note 103, at 78-84; Hirshman, supra note 113; Ingber, supra
note 121.
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Nozick also believes that individuals have the right to remain free
from physical injury caused by another. 123 The analysis of the future
claimant dilemma under Nozick's theory of entitlement begins with the
historical principle of this basic right. Such a right that grants the
individual control over his or her person carries with it the right to
have these liberties protected under the notion of a minimal state. 124
Accordingly, the state should protect future tort claimants from
physical violation by others. Then, if a physical violation occurs, the
injured party is entitled to compensation."2
On the other side of the equation, a corporation has the right to
engage in business for profit. 126 The corporation earns such a right
from the historical principles of the entitlement theory. However,
although this right exists, it does have its limits. For example, when a
corporation begins to make a profit at the expense of an individual's
right to remain free from invasion within his or her personal sphere,
the principle of rectification applies.
27
Under the rectification principle, the transfer of the individual's right
to remain free from injury to the corporation without adequate compen-
sation is an unjust transfer that the state has the authority to rectify.'28
Thus, in Piper, the future tort claimants are entitled to the right of non-
violation within their personal sphere and Piper should have to pay
compensation for violating their rights. However, Nozick's theory
focuses on rectifying past injustices and, because the Piper future
claimants have not incurred injuries, an unjust transfer of rights has
not yet occurred. 29 Until the future tort victims actually suffer a
physical harm, Piper has not invaded their personal spheres and need
not pay compensation.
Nozick's theory commands such a result because Piper is com-
pletely within its individual sphere and historical entitlement when it
123. See NOZICK, supra note 103, at 27-28, 268-71 (discussing the substantial effects
on a person's life that warrant protection under the minimal-state theory); see also
Charles Taylor, The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
HERE AND Now, supra note 120 at 34, 37 (discussing Nozick's method of arguing for the
application of his theory based upon society's "current conception of individual
rights").
124. See NOZICK, supra note 103, at 26-28, 135-37.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 153-55.
127. See id. at 228-31.
128. See id. at 78-84, 152; see also Mann, supra note 117, at 32.
129. "[C]ompensation is not compelled, [nor] rights protected for forward-looking
reasons of the community, but rather just in recognition of those rights." Ingber, supra
note 121, at 789 n.82 (quoting Fried, Is Liability Possible?, in 3 THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES, supra note 121, at 91, 121).
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manufactures a product, even if the product is defective.' 30 In fact,
Piper remains within its individual entitlement even when it places
defective products into the stream of commerce, as that is the nature of
its business. Piper only oversteps its bounds when its business activ-
ities encroach upon another's sphere without just compen-sation., a
Therefore, until the future tort victims suffer an actual harm, they have
no right to compensation. The societal effects of this deprivation are
irrelevant as the focal point is what is best for the individual, not for
society as a whole.
32
The theories of Posner, Rawls, and Nozick each approach the future
claimant dilemma with a different focus. Posner and Rawls both posit
theories which concentrate on the big picture and the achievement of
social justice. Posner concludes that social justice is the maximization
of societal wealth.' 33 Rawls posits that procedural fairness in distri-
bution creates a just society. 34 In contrast to these theories, Nozick's
theory has a narrower focus. Under Nozick's theory, justice is the
maximization of individual autonomy with minimal state inter-
vention. 135
The Piper136 decision is most in line with Nozick's theory. The
Piper court focused on the optimal solution for the debtor, holding that
some prepetition contact between the debtor and the future tort
claimants 37 was necessary to allow the claim of the future tort claim-
ants. 38  However, neither Nozick's theory nor the Piper decision
takes into account the interests of the various parties involved in the
bankruptcy case, such as the tort victims and the surrounding
community. 39 Although the Piper court believed that it acted in the
best interests of creditors, it nevertheless failed to consider the long-
term effects of its decision on these individuals." Because such a
narrow analysis of the problem disregards the wide-spread effect of
the decision on the fundamental principles underlying bankruptcy
130. See NOZICK, supra note 103, at 54-84 (discussing when an individual's conduct
crosses into another's boundary and thus gives rise to a right of compensation).
131. See id.; Hirshman, supra note 113, at 1006-07.
132. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 113-32 and accompanying text.
136. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
137. Id. at 439.
138. Id. at 439-40.
139. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
140. For a discussion of the short-sighted nature of the Piper decision, see supra part
II.C.
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law,14 1 applying the theories of Posner and Rawls may achieve a better
result. 14' This approach suggests that the wrongful conduct of the
debtor prepetition creates liability on the part of the debtor thereby
supporting a contingent and unmatured claim under section 101(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code.
143
IV. IS THE "JUST" SOLUTION TO THE FUTURE CLAIMANT DILEMMA
A WORKABLE ONE?
The normative principles established by Posner's theory of wealth
maximization and Rawls's theory of social justice demonstrate that the
optimal solution to the future claimant dilemma is somewhat broader
than that reached by the Piper court,'" yet not without limits. 45 This
part suggests that the optimal solution to the future claimant dilemma is
achieved by combining the strengths of each theory of justice set forth
in part III and analyzing the problem through the following two
questions: (1) Do the future claimants hold a section 101(5) claim?;
and (2) If a claim exists, how should the claim be treated within the
bankruptcy case?
A. Do the Future Claimants Hold a Claim Against the Debtor?
Considering the bankruptcy policies of granting a fresh start to the
debtor, providing an equitable distribution to creditors' 46 and
Congress's desire to define the term "claim" broadly, 4 7 future claim-
ants should not have difficulty asserting their claims against the debtor
in the bankruptcy case when the claims arise out of the debtor's pre-
petition conduct. This result allows the debtor to account for all of its
141. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
142. Although both Posner's and Rawls's theories achieve the same result of
allowing the claims of the future claimants to be asserted in the bankruptcy proceeding,
the substantive analysis of each theory differs and may produce different results in
particular circumstances. For example, under Posner's theory, the debtor is liable only
when the debtor committed wrongful prepetition conduct to decrease the aggregate
wealth of society. Whereas, under Rawls's theory, no minimum limit exists and
accordingly, the individuals behind the veil of ignorance could formulate a rule that
allows future claims to be asserted against the debtor for any prepetition conduct so that
they are assured of protection if they ever come into contact with a product of the debtor
once the veil is removed. This substantive discrepancy between the two theories
suggests that Posner's parameters provide a more feasible analysis.
143. For a detailed discussion of how Posner's and Rawls's theories apply to Piper,
see supra parts III.A.1 and III.B.2 respectively.
144. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 168 B.R. 434, 439-40 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
145. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 2-4, 14, and accompanying text.
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prepetition activities in the bankruptcy case 148 and, thus, a more real-
istic plan of reorganization will emerge. Formulating a plan that con-
templates, rather than ignores, a contingent liability of the debtor
provides more security for the debtor, the creditors, and the future tort
victims as a lesser likelihood exists that the occurrence of the future
contingency will cause the demise of the entire plan of reorganization.
To achieve this result, the conduct test,149 as applied by the Grady
v. A.H. Robins court, 5' provides the most practical approach. 5 '
Application of the conduct test not only achieves the desired result of
allowing the future claimants' claims in the bankruptcy case, 152 but its
application also harnesses support from notions of social justice.
Posner's wealth maximization theory accords with this test and
formulates appropriate boundaries for its application. 153 These
boundaries arise because Posner's theory requires that the debtor's
prepetition conduct be wrongful'5 4 thereby creating a basis for the
debtor's ultimate liability. 5 5 Otherwise, the conduct of the debtor
would deplete the aggregate wealth of society and liability would not
attach.
Additionally, Rawls's theory corresponds with the A.H. Robins
conduct test. 156 It does not, however, provide the safeguards inherent
in Posner's theory. Individuals behind the veil of ignorance may
select to apply an expansive interpretation of the conduct test so that
any conduct of the debtor creates a claim for the future claimants in the
bankruptcy case. 7 The variations possible under Rawls's theory of
148. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation: VIIL Bankruptcy and
Insurance Issues, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1587-88 nn. 77-83 (1986) (discussing how
automatic stay protects future claimants by allowing debtor to organize its estate).
149. The conduct test evaluates the existence of a claim based upon "the time when
the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were performed." In re Johns-Manville
Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also supra part II.A.2 (discussing
how the conduct test is satisfied); supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
150. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1260
(1988).
151. The discussion throughout this Article is focused primarily on the basic
question of whether a future claimant's claim should be allowed in the bankruptcy
proceeding under § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. Having determined that such claims
are allowable, a court may then proceed to handle the claims in several ways. For
various examples, see A.H. Robins, 839 F.2d at 198 and Johns-Manville, 57 B.R. at
680.
152. See supra part II.A.2; supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
155. See supra part III.A.1.
156. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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social justice makes its application troublesome. However, the under-
lying principles of Rawls's theory do serve to buttress Posner's ap-
proach. Thus, the social concepts of both theories, together with the
economic limitations of wealth maximization, make the conduct test a
feasible alternative for the courts to apply.
B. What Treatment Should Be Accorded the Future Claimants'
Claims?
Having determined that future claimants, such as those in Piper,
hold section 101(5) claims against the debtor, the question then
becomes how to treat these claims in the bankruptcy case. Several
courts have attempted to account for the claims of future claimants in
the debtor's plan of reorganization by establishing a trust fund or an
escrow account. 158 The disadvantage of these arrangements is that a
portion of the debtor's assets sits in an account that the debtor cannot
access in order to help with the immediate reorganization of the
company. Requiring that these assets remain dormant may work to the
detriment of all of the parties involved, potentially causing the
liquidation of the company. 5 9 Neither the debtor, the creditors, nor
the future tort victims benefit from such an arrangement. Thus, if the
future claimants' claims are to be allowed in the bankruptcy case, a
more efficient remedy needs to be fashioned-a remedy that supports
the reorganization of the debtor, yet does not ignore the claims of the
future tort victims.
To formulate such a remedy, it is useful to consider both Nozick's
entitlement theory and the Piper decision. Although the Piper court
erred in disallowing the future claimants' claims, 60 the court's
158. For a detailed explanation of the types of trust employed by the courts to
accommodate the needs of future claimants, see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.,
129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing the Johns-Manville trust); Susan S.
Ford, Note, Who Will Compensate the Victims of Asbestos-Related Diseases?
Manville's Chapter 11 Fuels the Fire, ENVTL. L. 465 (1984) (discussing the claimants'
dilemma in Johns-Manville); Steven J. Parent, Judicial Creativity in Dealing with Mass
Torts in Bankruptcy, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 381 (1990); Georgene M. Vairo, The
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617
(1992) (discussing the trust established for the Dalkon Shield claimants).
159. See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy,
104 YALE L.J. 367 (1994) (suggesting a capital markets trust fund which awards shares
rather than cash as a possible way to keep firms solvent and still able to compensate
future claimants); see also Steven L. Schultz, In re Joint Eastern & Southern District
Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged-A Proposal for the Use of Federal
Common Law in Mass Tort Class Actions, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 553 (1992) (arguing that a
federal class action is the best way to protect all claimants).
160. By definition, the future tort victims' claims are contingent and fall within §
101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. See notes 2-4, 19-20, 35 and accompanying text; see
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concerns regarding the feasibility of accounting for such claims when
the injury has not yet occurred, similar to Nozick's rectification
principle, suggest a workable alternative to the trust/escrow remedy
and recognize the debtor's potential liability, but postpone payment
until the time of the injury. Stated in more practical terms, this remedy
would allow the future claimants to bring claims in the bankruptcy
case, but the claims would receive treatment different than the debtor's
other claims. The treatment of the future tort victims' claims should be
as follows: (1) If the debtor reorganizes, the claims are declared non-
dischargeable so that the debtor, as the reorganized company, remains
liable to the future claimants; (2) if the company or substantially all of
its assets are sold, the claims are accounted for in the purchase price
and the successor corporation remains liable to the future claimants;161
or (3) if the debtor liquidates, the future claimants receive nothing.
The first step of the proposal attempts to strike a balance between
granting the debtor a complete discharge from future liability for pre-
petition torts and dissipating assets from the debtor's estate to pay now
for harm that may occur in the future. Declaring the claims of the
future claimants nondischargeable 6 2 permits the debtor to use the
assets in its estate to facilitate a reorganization, 63 while protecting the
future claimants' right to a claim for compensation when, and if,
liability arises. Such a result recognizes that the future claimants had
contingent and unliquidated claims against the debtor; protects the
future claimants from a debtor's defense based upon discharge; and
allows the debtor to discharge its current liabilities, reorganize, and
also discussion supra part IV.A (discussing whether the future claimants hold a claim
against the debtor).
161. The discount in the purchase price will assist the debtor in marketing the
company or its assets and reflects the expressed assumption of liability by the successor
corporation.
162. This author recognizes that legislative action may be necessary to enable the
courts to declare a debtor's liability for tortious prepetition conduct nondischargeable.
On several previous occasions, Congress has recognized exceptions to discharge for
individual debtors with respect to various types of tortious conduct. See I I U.S.C. §
523(a)(6)(9). Similar public policy considerations exist for prohibiting either an
individual or a corporate debtor operated by individuals to escape liability for its
prepetition tortious conduct. See Lyle, supra note 8, at 1342-44. As such, a similar
exception to discharge is appropriate.
163. Preserving the debtor's resources for its reorganization is one of the main
advantages that nondischargeability has over the use of a trust fund. However, if the
debtor's estate has the capacity to fund a trust fund or escrow account, this remedy, with
appropriate safeguards, is also an effective means of protecting the interests of the future
claimants. There are several types of safeguards that may be implemented to ensure
payment to all members of the class of future claimants such as establishing a cap on the
amount that any one future claimant may receive from the fund and requiring the debtor to
make annual payments to keep sufficient capital in the fund.
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restore its financial health so that it is ready to face any future liability
that may arise.
The second step of the proposal addresses the situation that exists
when, subsequent to the bankruptcy case, the debtor's business or its
product remains in operation under the control of another entity.
Although the claims of the future claimants may be deemed nondis-
chargeable, the practical effect of a sale of the debtor's business or
substantially all of its assets is a liquidation and dissolution of the
corporate debtor. Thus, upon the completion of the sale, the future
claimants hold viable claims, but have no viable entity against which to
assert such claims.
Accordingly, because the debtor's business, or at least its product,
is being continued by another entity, the future claimants should have
some recourse against the successor corporation.' 64 Such a result is
achieved under either the product line or the continuity of enterprise
successor liability tests. Moreover, such a result is a fair result. If a
successor corporation is going to accept the benefits of the business
and product design of the debtor, it should be liable for the burdens as
well. Accounting for the risk of liability in the purchase price assists
the debtor in marketing the business and allows the successor corpor-
ation to plan for any future liability.
Finally, if a debtor liquidates and neither its business nor product
continues in operation, the future claimants receive nothing. This
result is mandated by the circumstances surrounding a liquidation not
accompanied by a sale of the debtor's business or substantially all of
its assets. As noted above, if the debtor liquidates and dissolves, there
is no entity for the future claimants to proceed against. Further, if
neither the debtor's business nor substantially all of its assets are sold,
there is no successor corporation for the future claimants to proceed
against. Thus, the claims of the future claimants may be deemed non-
dischargeable, but the future claimants will not receive any return on
such claims.
This three-step proposal offers the advantage of providing a sense
of certainty to all of the parties involved in the case. Further, it allows
the debtor to use all of its current resources to reorganize and pay
creditors while also protecting the rights of the future tort victims. 65
164. If a debtor could evade a debt deemed nondischargeable by selling its business to
another entity, the public policy considerations of deterring harmful product designs and
compensating victims are defeated.
165. Preserving the rights of the future claimants also alleviates any concerns
regarding issues of notice and due process. For a general discussion-of the constitutional
issues raised by the future claimant dilemma, see Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie A. Gavrin,
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By explicitly recognizing that liability continues to exist for injuries
caused by the prepetition product, the reorganized company or succes-
sor company can plan to accommodate these liabilities in the future so
as to avoid another bankruptcy. In addition, the future tort victims are
assured of the right to assert their claims without the complications of
successor liability and dischargeability. Thus, this solution provides a
feasible alternative satisfying the policies of both bankruptcy and tort
law.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem presented in In re Piper Aircraft Corp. " is a complex
dilemma. To accommodate the vast interests and social policies at
stake, future claimants should receive special treatment in a bankruptcy
case. Courts should apply the conduct test to determine whether the
future claimants hold claims against the debtor. If such claims exist,
then the claims should be treated as nondischargeable liabilities of the
debtor. This treatment provides a comprehensive analysis of the
problem and a solution that accords with notions of social justice, the
statutory language and legislative history of section 101(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code, and the principles underlying bankruptcy law.
Constitutional Limitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L.
REV. 745 (1993). For a general discussion of the procedural problems with notice, see
Robert M. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in Bankruptcy Cases,
29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215 (1994).
166. 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
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